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Abstract 26 
A feasibility study was conducted on the impacts of the new Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) 27 
rules requiring catches in regulated fisheries to be landed and counted against quotas of each 28 
Member State - the landing obligation (LO), and that catch of species subject to the LO 29 
below a minimum conservation reference size (MCRS) be restricted to purposes other than 30 
direct human consumption. The aim was to estimate the level of discarded fish likely to be 31 
covered by the new rules, the impact of the rules on EU fisheries and the regulatory 32 
challenges and responses to them. Data from EU's Scientific, Technical and Economic 33 
Committee on Fisheries (STECF) database were analysed to estimate the volume of 34 
unwanted catches produced by EU fisheries. Views were sought from policy officials and 35 
fisheries scientists through a questionnaire on the implications of the LO and the control of 36 
fisheries across Member States, and the potential adjustments that might be needed. Findings 37 
show that 11% (44,000 tonnes) of the total catches of EU countries from which data were 38 
available are of fish under MCRS. The species with the highest volume of undersized 39 
discards associated with the lowest quota, which would potentially restrict the fishing 40 
opportunities for other quota species (i.e. choke species), are plaice and haddock with 18,000 41 
and 14,000 tonnes of undersized fish respectively, followed by whiting and cod with 5,000 42 
and 6,000 tonnes of undersized fish respectively. Discards data shows that the Netherlands, 43 
United Kingdom, France and Belgium will be most affected by landings for non-human 44 
markets. Findings also show that existing infrastructure at landing ports in all Member States 45 
is limited because there are currently limited facilities in place to handle animal by-products 46 
produced by the catching sector. Policy officials maintained that while they could support the 47 
fishing industry through funding programmes, it is the responsibility of fishers to ensure they 48 
have the right infrastructure to handle unwanted catches. The expectation is that the LO 49 
combined with the restriction to non-human consumption purposes will encourage fishers to 50 
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internalise the costs of catching unwanted fish and motivate them to avoid unwanted catch. 51 
This will be realised if sufficient flexibility is given to fishers to find their own solutions to 52 
reducing unwanted catches. It is concluded that gear technology measures exist to enable the 53 
regulated fisheries to increase gear selectivity. 54 
 55 
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1. Introduction 76 
High-levels of discards have been considered a big problem in European and global fisheries 77 
for many years [1,2]. Discards vary throughout EU fisheries – in some cases representing 78 
more than 60% of the catch, while in other cases – including pelagic fisheries – being very 79 
low [3]. In global fisheries, Kelleher [1] estimated that at least 7.3 million tonnes of catch are 80 
thrown away each year. There are several ecological and socioeconomic reasons for wanting 81 
to reduce fisheries discards. Discarding of dead or dying catch results in fishing mortality 82 
with no economic benefit as the catch cannot be sold or eaten, and cannot contribute to the 83 
fishery in future years [4]. Alverson et al [5] suggest that the foregone value of discards may 84 
match that of landings, equating to potentially billions of dollars lost. For commercial species 85 
discarding not only represents a waste of resources but may also threaten the future of stocks, 86 
endangering fisheries and the livelihoods of many fishers [6]. One of the major issues 87 
associated with discarding commercial species, particularly in EU fisheries, is that it means 88 
that catches are higher than the Total Allowable Catches (TAC), which can result in fishing 89 
mortality exceeding targets [7-9]. Non-target species may also be overexploited due to 90 
incidental capture and discarding [10]. Furthermore, the impacts of discarding extend beyond 91 
the commercial and non-target fish species [11], affecting the balance, diversity and 92 
functioning of ecosystems [4] including disruption of ecosystem nutrient cycles [7,12]. 93 
Discarding is therefore a major problem especially in mixed fisheries where it threatens 94 
endangered species, wasting resources, increasing fishery costs and impacting on food webs 95 
[13,14]. 96 
The need to reduce discards in European fisheries has long been recognised and the 97 
elimination of discarding and unwanted catches was identified as one of the main objectives 98 
under the 2012 reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). Article 15 of the new CFP 99 
Basic Regulation (Council Regulation No 1380/2013) introduces new rules on discards 100 
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including: (i) a landing obligation (LO) under which all catches of regulated species must be 101 
landed and counted against quotas of each Member State; and (ii) a requirement that catch of 102 
species subject to the LO below a minimum conservation reference size (MCRS) be restricted 103 
to purposes other than direct human consumption [15]. The new regulation was introduced on 104 
1 January 2015 for pelagic fish which have a TAC such as mackerel, herring and sprat, and is 105 
being rolled out to all demersal species which have TACs in a phased manner between 2016 106 
and 2019. The assumption behind the LO is that fishers will be incentivised to avoid catching 107 
fish under MCRS because it will be deducted from their catch quota and have to be sold in 108 
non-human consumption markets, with lower profit than that which can be achieved from the 109 
human consumption market [16,17]. These new rules for discards are the most important 110 
changes to fisheries management in the EU since the creation of the CFP, and therefore 111 
feasibility studies are needed to understand the foreseeable challenges and shortcomings of 112 
the new policy. 113 
The LO is expected not only to gradually end discarding of dead fish, but also record 114 
fishing mortality more comprehensively and thereby improve the quality of data used for 115 
scientific stock assessments [15]. However, discard bans are a relatively novel approach to 116 
address the discards problem, and still only used in a relatively small number of countries 117 
(e.g. Faroe Islands, Iceland, Norway and New Zealand) or particular fisheries (e.g. US 118 
Alaskan and Canada’s British Columbian ground fish trawl fisheries) [16,18]. Furthermore, 119 
past evidence shows that banning discards only works if supported by considerable data 120 
collection on the fishery (discarding rates, reasons for discarding, etc.) and integrated with 121 
incentives for compliance and additional mitigation measures [16,19]. In a management 122 
system with extensive mixed fisheries such as the EU, a LO could be particularly challenging 123 
for the viability of these fisheries, due to the high potential for ‘choke’ species (species with 124 
the lowest quota in a mixed-fishery, which restrict the fishing opportunities for other quota 125 
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species) [20]. The LO therefore has potential socio-economic and ecological consequences 126 
that need to be understood. Further, the odds for success of an EU LO need to be determined 127 
to enable fisheries managers put in place supporting measures to ensure success when fully 128 
implemented.  129 
One of the most challenging impacts of the LO is the need to find uses for the fish 130 
under MCRS. The combined effect of the requirements to land this fish and to restrict use for 131 
non-human consumption is to increase the supply of fish (of different species) for the non-132 
human consumption market. This presents some infrastructural and market challenges, and to 133 
meet them, there may need to be adaptations both in ports and in business organisations [17]. 134 
For instance, landing ports will need to have sufficient equipment, infrastructure and logistics 135 
to deal not only with an increase in landings, but also landings subject to separate regulatory 136 
conditions and destined for separate markets. In a UK based practical trial of the LO, 137 
Catchpole et al. [21] concluded that some ports, particularly the smaller ports, will have 138 
problems of congestion, logistical difficulties and added cost (for staff and transport) to deal 139 
with the previously discarded fish. They also concluded that with the various exemptions 140 
from the LO [15], it is difficult to predict the actual levels of material that will be landed and 141 
therefore the level of investment required for additional infrastructure (transport, storage bins, 142 
physical space, freezers, cold rooms). Moreover, given that discards cannot go to direct 143 
human consumption, they many need to fulfil all requirements provided in the EC Regulation 144 
1224/2009, such as having a physical barrier to avoid cross contamination with catch destined 145 
for human consumption. 146 
This feasibility study reviews the impacts of the new CFP rules requiring catches in 147 
regulated fisheries to be landed and counted against quotas of each Member State (the LO), 148 
and requiring that catch of species subject to the LO below a MCRS be restricted to purposes 149 
other than direct human consumption. The study estimates the level of discarded fish likely to 150 
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be covered by the new rules, the impact of the rules on EU fisheries and the regulatory 151 
challenges and responses to them. The introduction of the LO has brought the need for a 152 
fundamental rethink of how fishing activities are managed and controlled in the EU. In 153 
particular, the LO provides an opportunity for a decisive move away from technical measures 154 
based on prescriptive rules to a radically more flexible and adaptable approach to achieving 155 
greater selectivity, focused at regional, fishery or even individual vessel level. Here, the 156 
major challenges facing the LO are explored and management recommendations are provided 157 
on how to (i) enforce the LO regulations, (ii) avoid unwanted catches, (iii) utilise fish under 158 
MCRS, and (iv) incentivise implementation of the LO.  159 
 160 
2. Methods  161 
2.1 Estimating levels of fish under the Minimum Conservation Reference Size (MCRS)  162 
A preliminary question underlying the impact of the LO and the related requirements 163 
concerns estimates of the volume of unwanted catches produced by EU fisheries. Under the 164 
new CFP, only discarded fish under the MCRS will have to come ashore and put to the non-165 
human consumption market. Unlike the old CFP, there will be no discarding of over-quota 166 
fish; all of which will go to the human consumption market. Estimates of the volume of fish 167 
under MCRS can provide not only an indication of the scale and nature of the problem, but 168 
also information on the ports that will be affected, the final destinations of catches, and 169 
potential uses that they could be turned into.  170 
The main source of data for estimating the volume of discards was the EU's Scientific, 171 
Technical and Economic Committee on Fisheries (STECF) database compiled by the STECF 172 
Expert Working Group on the Evaluation of Fishing Effort Regimes in European Waters 173 
[22]. Under the Data Collection Framework (DCF) 174 
(http://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/web/stecf/ewg1313), each EU Member State is obliged to carry 175 
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out data collection programs and quantify levels of discards using on-board observers. The 176 
STECF database has details of landings and discards estimates for a range of fisheries, areas 177 
and species covering 2003-2012 [22]. As data are more reliable in more recent years, and the 178 
focus is on species subject to the LO, only information on TAC regulated species covering 179 
the years 2010-2012 were used.  180 
This paper is also only focused on demersal species under quota. Pelagic species were 181 
excluded since they have limited data on discard levels. It is important to understand the 182 
quality and limitations of the data presented. Although observer programmes provide good 183 
quality data from the sampled trips, owing to their cost they often have low coverage; 184 
typically, around 1% of all of the fishing activities. These data are therefore extrapolated to 185 
the fleet level. The low sampling levels and the inherent variation in discarding levels 186 
between trips can lead to high variability in the data. Further, the low coverage of national 187 
sampling programmes means that confidence bounds around discard estimates are wide and 188 
in some cases discard estimates for fisheries 'borrow' information from other fisheries where 189 
no specific discard information is available for that fishery under the assumption that discard 190 
patterns are comparable. Therefore, owing to the incomplete nature of information on 191 
discarded fish and the assumptions used to generate estimates, care should be taken in the 192 
interpretation of these data. However, these are the best available data. Data in the STECF 193 
database and its quality is determined by the data collected, estimated and submitted to the 194 
STECF Fisheries Dependant Information Working Group by each Member State and in this 195 
paper no data were omitted or deleted. 196 
An age-length key enables the conversion between the length and the age of fish. The 197 
numbers of fish discarded at length was inferred from the numbers discarded at age available 198 
in the STECF database. The ICES DATRAS Database has age-length-keys generated by 199 
several trawl surveys covering the Baltic Sea, Skagerrak, Kattegat, North Sea, Bay of Biscay, 200 
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English Channel, Celtic Sea, Irish Sea, West of Scotland and Southern waters. At present, 201 
there are more than 15 years of continuous time series data in DATRAS, but only data 202 
between 2010 and 2012 were used. The species with age-length keys included cod, haddock, 203 
whiting, saithe, megrim, sole and plaice. Other species with MCRS, such as hake, pollack, 204 
ling, blue ling and bass did not have age-length information and they were not included for 205 
the undersized discards analyses. Using the age-length keys for each geographical area 206 
(North Sea, Baltic, North Western Waters and Southern Waters), the proportion of fish under 207 
and over MCRS at age was estimated. If no age-length key was available for a certain species 208 
in a geographical area, it was borrowed from the nearest area. 209 
To estimate the biomass-at-age, weight-at-age information from the ICES assessment 210 
working group reports, was applied for each stock [23-26]. For each year between 2010 and 211 
2012, landings and discards biomass at age (tonnes) was estimated by multiplying the weight-212 
at-age with the number-at-age. The mean biomass at age of landings and discards for the 213 
three years 2010, 2011 and 2012 were calculated. To ensure consistency, the aged biomass of 214 
landings and discards were adjusted with the overall landings and discards (where these 215 
differed). The proportion of fish under MCRS at age was multiplied with the biomass-at-age 216 
to estimate the biomass at age that was under MCRS. 217 
To understand how the fishing ports will be affected with the landing obligation and 218 
undersized catches, the main European ports receiving fish from EU fleets were identified 219 
from European Fish Auction DataNet. The only source of information available on the 220 
overall landings (tonnes) per port was the European Fish Auction DataNet report [27], with 221 
landings information in 2003, for seven EU countries - Ireland, UK, Portugal, Netherlands, 222 
Denmark, France, and Belgium. Although these data are historic, these were the only official 223 
landings data promptly available. The proportion of landings in each port in relation to the 224 
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total landings in the country was estimated and applied to the undersized discards estimates 225 
per country, to estimate undersize discards per port.  226 
 227 
2.2 Assessing control issues of the Landing Obligation 228 
To provide a reliable and up-to-date idea of the impact of the LO on the production, landing 229 
and potential markets for previously discarded fish, a questionnaire was developed for 230 
scientists and policy officials dealing with implementation of the new CFP. The questionnaire 231 
was designed to elicit the respondents’ views on the implications of the landing obligation 232 
and the control of fisheries across EU Member States, and the potential adjustments that 233 
might be needed. The questionnaire included open – and closed-ended questions to gather 234 
specific information about the landing obligation in each country. The questions focused on 235 
gathering details from each Member State on: 236 
• State of infrastructure at each key port where the unwanted catches would be landed. 237 
Respondents were asked to indicate the status of infrastructure for storage, handling, 238 
sorting and grading, logistics, and security that is needed or available to handle 239 
unwanted catches landed for non-human consumption market in the various ports in 240 
their country. 241 
• Potential uses for unwanted catches. Respondents were asked to state utilisation 242 
opportunities that are available to use unwanted catches, and for each opportunity to 243 
provide the species used, whether the utilisation opportunity was already developed or 244 
yet to be developed and any comments including whether there are potential barriers 245 
in using discards. 246 
• Perceptions of respondents regarding the principal measures in place in each Member 247 
State to regulate, monitor and enforce the landing obligation. 248 
 249 
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A list of policy officials and scientists dealing with the new CFP in the various Member 250 
States was compiled from past projects and contacts held by the Project Team. The list had 251 
names and email addresses of scientists from 15 Member States and policy officials from 7 252 
Member States. Every person on the list was contacted to take part. In total, replies from 253 
eight Member States were received. Some of these had filled in the questionnaire while 254 
others just sent an email message providing the status of analyses related to the LO in their 255 
country. The responses were summarised for each Member State. 256 
 257 
3 Results 258 
3.1 Volume of undersized fish 259 
The overall discard rates, based on all regulated species and including over-quota (large fish) 260 
and under MCRS discards vary between 1% in gears such as pots and traps, dredges and 261 
longlines, and 60%-70% for beam and otter trawlers (Table 1). Estimates indicate that 11% 262 
(around 44,000 tonnes) of the total catches (of species with minimum conservation reference 263 
sizes, excluding pelagic species) were of fish under MCRS, across all the countries from 264 
which data were available. The countries that show the highest discard rates of quota species 265 
(including large and small fish) are Netherlands (54% discard rate), Belgium (34%), 266 
Germany (26%) and France (21%). The discard rates in each fishery vary greatly among 267 
countries: the otter trawlers’ discard rates range between 4% in Lithuania and 75% in the 268 
Netherlands; beam trawlers’ discard rates vary between 13% in the UK and 73% in Germany; 269 
and the netters’ discard rates vary between 1% in Germany and 29% in the Netherlands 270 
(Table 1). 271 
 272 
 273 
[Table 1 here] 274 
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 275 
 276 
In most countries, under MCRS (i.e. that which will need to come ashore to the non-human 277 
consumption market) discards represent 30-40% of the total discards. This indicates that most 278 
discards in EU countries are due to quota restrictions and/or are market driven. Fish over the 279 
MCRS may have been rejected by fishers owing to the low relative value compared with 280 
other size grades (high-grading) or as a consequence of the quota being exhausted. In terms 281 
of proportional catches, the countries that will be most affected by landing small juvenile fish 282 
are Belgium, Netherlands and United Kingdom, with 13%, 10% and 8% of the total catches, 283 
respectively, being undersized fish. In terms of the total weight of undersized discards, the 284 
countries which have the largest volume of undersized catches are Netherlands (11,026 t), 285 
UK (10,610 t) and France (4,593 t).  286 
The species with the highest volume of undersized discards, and therefore potentially 287 
choke species, are plaice and haddock, with 18,000 and 14,000 tonnes of undersized fish, 288 
respectively, followed by whiting and cod, with 5,000 and 6,000 tonnes of undersized fish 289 
(Table 2). Megrim and saithe have the lowest proportion of undersized discards, with 450 and 290 
200 tonnes, respectively. Countries have different key species of undersized fish: in 291 
Germany, Netherlands and Sweden the species with the highest undersized discards are 292 
whiting, while in France and Ireland it is cod, and in the UK and Denmark it is haddock. The 293 
figures provided here are the mean of three years to reduce the influence in the data of 294 
particularly strong year classes that occur for some species. However, depending on the life 295 
history and population dynamics of each species, yearly or occasional high pulses of 296 
recruitment will dictate the catches of undersized and juvenile fish. So it is possible that other 297 
species may be the most important during the implementation period of the landing 298 
obligation.  299 
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 301 
[Table 2 here] 302 
 303 
 304 
3.2 Dealing with undersized fishes subject to LO and MCRS that must be landed  305 
Findings show little evidence on the ability of smaller ports to handle fish for the non-human 306 
consumption market, as there is currently little infrastructure at these ports to support the 307 
landing of this material. This could be problematic especially on coasts where there are many 308 
small ports with small quantities of undersized fish expected to be landed, and the fishers 309 
have low income and the nearest fish meal factory is several hundred kilometres away. As 310 
mentioned, the underlying data must be interpreted with care, and so it was only possible to 311 
make a cursory analysis on how each port will be affected by the LO. Belgium has three ports 312 
and the two that will be most affected are Zeebrugge and Oostende (Table 3). In Denmark, 313 
the landings are more spread out among the ports and the ports that potentially will be more 314 
impacted by landing of unwanted undersized landings are Skagen, Esbjerg, Thyboron and 315 
Elvrige Eavne. The French ports most affected by the undersize landings will be Bolougne 316 
Sur Mer, Le Guilvinee and Lorient. In the UK, the ports with the highest landings are in 317 
Scotland (Peterhead, Fraserburgh and Lerwick) while in England, the ports that will be most 318 
affected with landing of undersized fish are Newlyn, Brixham and Plymouth. Ireland has a 319 
major port, Killybegs that supports 46% of the landings and most certainly it will be most 320 
affected by the LO. The ports in Netherlands most affected will be Yerseke and Urk. Spain, 321 
Portugal, Sweden, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland had no landings information per port. 322 
 323 
 324 
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[Table 3 here] 325 
 326 
 327 
The existing infrastructure appears limited in all Member States because there are currently 328 
limited facilities in place to handle animal by-products produced by the catching sector. 329 
Policy officials maintained that while they could support the fishing industry through funding 330 
programmes such as the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF), it is the 331 
responsibility of fishers to ensure they have the right infrastructure to handle unwanted 332 
catches. In summary, the larger ports are able to handle at least some non-human 333 
consumption landings as they already process industrial landings. However, it is not known 334 
how smaller ports may deal with these issues as they do not possess most of the infrastructure 335 
required.  336 
The logistics towards transport of undersized fishes subject to LO and MCRS to a 337 
central collection point and refrigeration will increase costs of handling this material. Storage 338 
facilities will likely be required to enable the aggregation of sufficient quantities of material 339 
from smaller ports to make subsequent transport or treatment more cost-effective. It can be 340 
concluded that, in general, the Member States are not yet ready to receive these undersized 341 
fishes and have some way to go before having sufficient infrastructures and logistics in place 342 
to deal with it. 343 
With regards to the challenges posed to business organisations, the commercial / 344 
investment environment is difficult. Currently, it is hard to estimate both the level of supply 345 
of these fish (and the location of that supply) and the demand (since some of the markets are 346 
new). Moreover, since the overriding objective of the new discard rules is to reduce unwanted 347 
catches as far as possible, and since it is anticipated that unwanted catches will be reduced – 348 
for example through enhancements in fishing gear selectivity and changing fishing patterns 349 
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and behaviour – the supply of this fish has the potential to decrease over time. Another 350 
challenge is to ensure that products do not find their way into black markets or, once landed 351 
for the non-human consumption market, reappear back into the human consumption market. 352 
Many alternative ways of utilising undersized fishes subject to LO and MCRS do, however, 353 
already exist. 354 
Across the Member States, the final destinations of the undersized fishes include 355 
processing into fish meal, fish oil, food ingredients, biogas, animal, pet, and aqua feed, 356 
pharmaceuticals, cosmetics and pot bait. Of these utilisation routes, processing into fishmeal 357 
and fish oil appears to show the highest potential, since it is already well developed for 358 
finfish species in Germany, Spain, England and Sweden. Pet food, food ingredients, and food 359 
for minks (fur industry) are already developed in Germany, Sweden and Denmark, while 360 
biogas has been partially developed in England and Germany. Others such as ensiling 361 
(liquefying fish), composting, rendering, and anaerobic digestion with energy recovery are 362 
available in England.  363 
 364 
4. Discussion 365 
The new LO has generated a need to review and update the control and technical regulations 366 
for fishing in EU waters as monitoring and control shifts from landings to fishing activities at 367 
sea. Article 15(11) establishes the need for catches of species below the MCRS to be 368 
restricted to purposes other than direct human consumption, including fish meal, fish oil, pet 369 
food, food additives, pharmaceuticals and cosmetics. This imposes challenges to Member 370 
States including how to promote and ensure selectivity in their fisheries, how to manage the 371 
unwanted catches, how to ensure compliance with the new CFP and how to dispose of 372 
unwanted catches once landed. Indeed, successful implementation of the new CFP is going to 373 
require support through a range of measures and approaches, including those addressing 374 
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technical, commercial, social, legal or regulatory and enforcement aspects. However, there is 375 
little available data or analysis which directly addresses the composition of discards in terms 376 
of being undersized fish (i.e. fish discarded on account of it being undersized) or quota-driven 377 
discards (i.e. larger fish – over the legal MCRS but discarded due to lack of quota). Our 378 
analyses therefore fill this gap and show that 11% (44,000 tonnes) of the total catches 379 
(excluding pelagic species) are of fish under MCRS, across all the countries from which data 380 
were available. The data also showed that the Netherlands, United Kingdom, France and 381 
Belgium are the countries that potentially will be most affected with landings for non-human 382 
markets. The gears with the highest catches of under sized fish are the beam and the otter 383 
trawlers, with 15% and 10% of catches as undersized, respectively. 384 
 385 
4.1 Enforcing the LO regulations 386 
One of the key challenges of the LO is the need for new regulatory and enforcement 387 
mechanisms, as the focus of monitoring and control shifts from landing activities to activities 388 
at sea. This shift requires that fishing and discarding practices around the vessel are 100 per 389 
cent monitored during fishing in order to detect what is caught and whether there is 390 
discarding. Currently, traditional methods of monitoring, which include dockside and fish 391 
market checking; the use of aircraft (including drones) to fly over fishing vessels; patrol 392 
vessels to carry out inspections at sea; vessel monitoring systems (VMS) using satellite 393 
positional data to plot the speed and location of vessels; observers on board vessels to record 394 
catches and other scientific data; and self-reported data (E-log, paper logbooks, sale notes, 395 
landing declarations), can meet this need only to a limited extent [28].  396 
In recognition of this, increasing attention is being applied to remote electronic 397 
monitoring (REM) systems as a means of attaining 100 per cent monitoring of fishing 398 
activities [28,29].  There are two aspects to monitoring compliance at-sea under the LO, both 399 
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relate to the documentation of the full catch. The first is ensuring that all catches of regulated 400 
species are retained on the vessel (unless exemptions are in place), and the second is the 401 
accurate recording of the full weight of the catch of regulated species so that removals of fish 402 
do not exceed allocated quotas. With the potential to deliver both aspects, REM systems 403 
entail the recording of fishing vessel activities through a system of sensors on fishing 404 
machinery and closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras which record footage of fish 405 
catching and processing, and the data and imagery is then reviewed onshore by compliance 406 
analysts [28,30,31]. REM technology is well tested in practice and its technical reliability has 407 
been proven [32]. Commenting on recent REM trials in the UK, Ulrich et al. [33] observed 408 
that "the impression of these trials is positive”. Studies of Scottish and Danish trials have also 409 
indicated a high degree of satisfaction from the fishers who voluntarily participated [34,35]. 410 
Of course, it could be argued that in such voluntary trials it is hard to disentangle incentives 411 
arising from additional quota from those arising from the REM, and it might be the case that 412 
the skippers of voluntary vessels are those already most likely to comply and keenest to 413 
collaborate with scientists. It is thus difficult to infer how REM would work if it became 414 
compulsory for all vessels. However, experiences in Canada and USA demonstrated that 415 
larger discard reductions were achieved after REM became mandatory compared with the 416 
initial years when the system was voluntary [36]. This is because the system became more 417 
strictly enforced and included all vessels, including the less cooperative ones [33]. 418 
In monitoring a regulatory obligation such as the LO, two key questions must be 419 
asked of REM: whether it is a cost-effective alternative to more traditional monitoring 420 
methods, and whether it can detect discards accurately. A WWF report [37] claims that trials 421 
of REM which have been carried across the world for more than 15 years have shown that 422 
together with random audits, REM has encouraged high levels of regulatory compliance due 423 
to its spot-check nature. There is no doubt that REM shows great potential in being applied to 424 
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the LO, and in theory, it could replace other control monitoring [35,38]. A case study 425 
comparing the costs of on-board observers and REM based on data from the Scottish catch 426 
quota monitoring scheme indicated costs varied greatly depending on factors such as the 427 
number of analysts, equipped vessels and observers [38], but also on the type of data to be 428 
generated from the system (basic compliance with the LO, catch estimates, and/or scientific 429 
biological data). The UK government recently concluded that fitting REM equipment on all 430 
vessels in the main segment of the demersal fleet (vessels over 15m) would be prohibitively 431 
expensive due to the high costs to government of analysing the electronic records and 432 
purchasing the necessary equipment [39]. Similarly, an independent study warned that 433 
science monitoring and analysis resources could become overwhelmed by it [29]. However, 434 
although the capital cost of purchasing and running the REM system could be met by 435 
Member State governments, it is possible that it could be funded through the structural 436 
funding programmes such as the EMFF.  Moreover, a risk-based approach could be applied 437 
to reduce the number of vessels required to have REM, by utilising the type of analyses 438 
presented here and other data sources, whereby monitoring would be targeted towards 439 
vessels/fleet segments with the highest catching capability and generating most historical 440 
discards, of both under and over MCRS fish. 441 
REM can be applied to a wide range of tasks including monitoring compliance with 442 
technical regulations, catch offloads, transport arrangements, corroborating logbook data, 443 
making catch estimates, collecting scientific biological length and species data and for 444 
minimizing interactions with protected species. A key advantage of REM is its ability to 445 
record continuously a large numbers of trips (compared to traditional on-board observer 446 
schemes). However, REM has some technical limitations, especially in obtaining fine detail 447 
data, including distinguishing between smaller commercial and non-commercial species, and 448 
recording precise weight and length measurements of fish, though it may be possible to 449 
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overcome this limitation by new tools of electronic measuring. There is more doubt, however, 450 
about the capacity of REM to monitor more complex demersal fisheries effectively. For 451 
instance, a recent study [40] evaluated the efficacy of REM for cod catches on vessels in a 452 
mixed bottom-trawl fishery and tested the hypothesis that cod catches are difficult to detect 453 
with video monitoring, specifically in catches with large volumes of by-catch. Attempts to 454 
improve the accuracy of REM data are already underway, which could address these issues: 455 
for example, automatic image recognition software is being developed to detect by-catch [35] 456 
and to infer catch composition and length distribution from video footage [41]. Recent work 457 
in the UK indicates that validation trips with observers is necessary to provide quality control 458 
in the data generated through REM [42]. REM does offer the potential to meet both 459 
compliance and science needs, but careful consideration must be before blurring the lines 460 
between these two management functions, which may need different programme designs and 461 
receive different responses from the fishing industry. 462 
 463 
4.2 Avoidance of unwanted catches 464 
Enforcement of the LO regulations would be considerably easier if fishers were able to avoid 465 
catching unwanted fish by using more selective fishing gear or avoiding risky areas, and if 466 
they were to accept the need for the LO regulations. On selective gear, it is important to 467 
recognize that the introduction of the discard ban in itself is seen as a driving force for 468 
developing more selective gears and methods. Measures to further incentivise the use of more 469 
selective gear include limiting access to certain areas or at certain times to those fishers using 470 
approved gears, and/or awarding additional quota or effort allocation to those using approved 471 
gears. Different technical measures may be suitable in different fisheries, and there is 472 
considerable appeal in an approach which allows for flexibility at the level of a specific 473 
fishery to deploy the most suitable and effective technical adaptations.  474 
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A wide range of gear-based technical measures to reduce the capture of unwanted fish 475 
during fishing operations have been developed and trialled in numerous European fisheries, 476 
and a substantial amount of work has focussed on improving the selective properties of trawls 477 
[43,44]. These gear selectivity devices include: i) coverless trawls (cutaway trawl) that are 478 
designed to allow unwanted fish to escape over the top of the trawl, successfully used for 479 
haddock and whiting [45,46]; ii) Escape panels (Square mesh panels, benthos release panels) 480 
where sections of conventional netting in the trawl is replaced with netting of larger mesh 481 
size or with meshes at different orientation to facilitate the escape of unwanted catches 482 
[47,48]; iii) Selection grids (separator grids, inclined panels) that include additional material, 483 
rigid, flexible grid or netting that is attached to the inner circumference of the trawl. Marine 484 
organisms unable to pass through the grid are instead guided to their escape. These have been 485 
successfully used to separate shrimps and prawns from fish e.g. [49-52]; and iv) Separator 486 
trawls that are horizontally split by a separating panel of netting and terminate in two codends 487 
(bags). This design utilises the different behaviour of species during the capture process, 488 
some species tend to move upward inside the trawl (whiting, haddock, hake, squid) while 489 
others remain on the bottom of the trawl (anglerfish, cod, sole, Nephrops) e.g. [53-55]. Some 490 
of these gear-based technical measures have been developed specifically in response to 491 
adaptation to the discard ban, and have delivered positive results (56-58). It is important to 492 
note that there are two categories of fish to be avoided, low value small fish under MCRS that 493 
have to be landed, and catches of species with restricted quotas that could stop the fishery 494 
should they become exhausted (also known as ‘choke species’). Therefore, changes to gears 495 
will need to address both these categories of unwanted fish; potentially in the same fishery 496 
for different species in mixed demersal fisheries.  497 
On avoiding risky areas, spatial measures may be helpful in steering fishers away 498 
from unwanted catches. The use of spatio-temporal fishery closures has been used to reduce 499 
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catches of both protected and catches of unwanted commercial species [14, 59, 60]. For 500 
example, Norway’s practice of using real time closures (RTCs) to reduce catches of juvenile 501 
fish has been positive, contributing to that country’s success in reducing reported discard 502 
levels by imposing a ban on discards in 1987. Initially, the economic cost to the fishing 503 
industry of compliance with the discard ban was relatively high as fishermen’s landings 504 
contained higher proportions of small fish with lower values, and the period for which the 505 
fishing sector remained unprofitable was estimated to have lasted four years. Today, 506 
however, the Norwegian and Barents Sea fisheries are some of the most prosperous in the 507 
world [61]. In the USA, a similar success story is recorded of a discard ban in the Alaskan 508 
ground-fish fishery, which has been operational since 1998. The retention of some vulnerable 509 
and commercially important species is prohibited and, if these catches exceed specified 510 
levels, the fishery has to be relocated or closed [44]. These spatial measures to reduce 511 
unwanted catches have proven to be successful since they incentivised more selective fishing 512 
[16] and sharply reduced discard rates. 513 
 514 
 515 
4.3 Utilising fish under MCRS 516 
Overall, across the Member States, utilisation opportunities for finfish discards are greater 517 
than those for shellfish discards: finfish discards could potentially generate an income if 518 
supplied for fishmeal production, whereas shellfish discards to commercial companies are 519 
more likely to be at a cost to the fishers. In practice, however, the potential for business 520 
development will vary from sector to sector, and locality to locality. Seafish [62] found that 521 
the estimated demand for bait is significantly larger than the potential supply that could come 522 
from unwanted fish. Trials confirmed that any whitefish quota species could be effectively 523 
used as bait by potters targeting crabs. 524 
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With regards to the price fishers would be paid for their landings of undersized fishes 525 
subject to LO and MCRS, undersized fishes can be sold to fishmeal plants for 65-170 Euros 526 
per tonne. This compares with approximately 500 Euros per tonne for the lowest value 527 
species and grades sold on the human consumption market. Therefore, there is a considerable 528 
price differential between the human consumption and nonhuman consumption markets. It is 529 
believed that directing the otherwise unwanted undersized fish to currently available markets 530 
would act as a disincentive to catch unwanted fish, because fish by-product processing 531 
companies are unable to compete on the price paid for the fish that enters the human food 532 
chain. 533 
The economic consequences of the LO will be influenced also by any additional costs 534 
imposed on the fishers for handling previously discarded material. For example, the crew 535 
may spend more time sorting the catch, to separate what will be landed for the human food 536 
chain from that for the non-human consumption. This may affect fishing operations, 537 
potentially reducing overall productivity, and it may even necessitate employing more crew 538 
[63]. In some cases, fish holds may be filled more rapidly due to the requirement to land all 539 
fish, leading to an earlier return to port. This, combined with the need to purchase extra 540 
boxes, ice and increased landing fees, means that fishers, even when securing top prices from 541 
fishmeal plants, may still make a loss when landing previously discarded material. Although 542 
other uses for the material may develop in time, and these may increase the demand and 543 
value of this material, the price differential between the discards and fish for the human food 544 
chain is so large it would seem unlikely that fishers would find economic advantage in 545 
targeting small fish for the non-human consumption market. It is much more likely that 546 
fishers will be motivated to avoid this material by adopting more selective gears or by 547 
discarding the material illegally. 548 
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A major worry does remain that the introduction of the LO for juvenile fish will 549 
stimulate black market trade. The specific concern is that since the LO will result in 550 
increasing numbers of juvenile fish being landed, these fish may find their way to human 551 
consumption black markets rather than the intended markets for non-human consumption. 552 
From a practical perspective, it is recognised that the LO may facilitate illegal trade because 553 
it will become usual to transport undersized specimens in the hold (whereas previously, such 554 
fish had to be discarded and could not be brought to land with risk of detection at sea); i.e. 555 
landing, storage and transportation of juveniles will be legal and this can simplify 556 
commercialisation via the black market. The risks of black market supply may be further 557 
enhanced if measures designed to support the LO are not properly or effectively deployed. A 558 
report examining the impact of the LO in the Mediterranean stated the apparent lack of 559 
incentives to land unwanted catches and the still unclear penalties for failure to meet this 560 
requirement in the Mediterranean, could encourage the illegal sale of fish below the 561 
minimum legal size [64]. In the absence of quotas and adequate monitoring of landings, the 562 
incentive for fishers to improve selectivity will likely remain low, and there is a recognised 563 
risk that undersized fish could be targeted by fishers for the human consumption market [65]. 564 
The LO of regulated species in the EU Mediterranean is thus raising some concerns about its 565 
effective implementation [66]. 566 
 567 
4.4 How to incentivise the LO implementation 568 
Fishers' acceptance of LO regulations will be influenced by whether the implementation 569 
measures are considered fair, whether the imposed regulations are perceived as meaningful, 570 
and whether there is sufficient compatibility between the regulations and traditional fishing 571 
patterns and practices [67]. Without adequate mechanisms and approaches to make the deal 572 
more attractive to fishermen, it is always going to be a struggle to achieve the LO 573 
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management objectives sought. Given the limitations of the resources for fisheries control 574 
and enforcement in the EU, it will be important to ensure the support from the fishers to the 575 
LO regulations to create a higher degree of voluntary compliance behaviour among fishers. 576 
Critical to the successful implementation of the new CFP will be effectively communicating 577 
the aims of the reforms to the fishers in the context of conserving stocks and delivering 578 
sustainable fishing opportunities. One way to ensure fishers’ support for the LO would be to 579 
persuade them of its ecological benefits. However, stakeholders at a session on the LO at the 580 
2014 ICES Annual Science Conference considered that although having limits on total 581 
catches could be scientifically supported, the objective of minimising waste and ecosystem 582 
impact by utilising all of the fish caught could not be fully supported by scientific evidence. 583 
Instead, the requirement to land all catches was thought to be mostly driven by societal and 584 
ethical concern. The absence of clearly demonstrated ecological benefits of bringing all 585 
catches to shore was believed could undermine the perceived legitimacy of the regulation and 586 
the willingness to comply from the industry [21].  587 
Another way of ensuring fishers support for the LO is to make its implementation 588 
more flexible. In recognition of the potential difficulties that fishing businesses may face 589 
when making the transition to the new management system, the new policy includes a 590 
number of exemptions and tools designed to assist in its successful implementation. Article 591 
15 (13) of the CFP basic regulation states that measures be taken by Member States to ensure 592 
compliance with the LO were subject to the principles of "efficiency and proportionality". In 593 
line with proportionality, the Regulation contains, quota management flexibilities: inter-594 
species flexibility and inter-year flexibility, and limited and strictly prescribed exceptions to 595 
discarding. Inter-species flexibility means the ability to deduct catches of a species, for which 596 
quota is no longer available, from the quota of another species, by up to 9% of the quota of 597 
the target species (Art 15 (8)). This provision will only apply to stocks of the non- target 598 
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species which are within safe biological limits. Inter-year flexibility, sometimes referred to as 599 
the ‘banking and borrowing provision’, means that up to 10% of a quota can be utilised in 600 
addition to the full quota or saved to be utilised in the next year (Art 15 (9)). Art 15 (4) 601 
allows exemption to the LO for species of which fishing is prohibited; species where 602 
scientific evidence demonstrates high survival rates and for catches falling under de minimus 603 
exemptions. The de minimus exemption means the ability to gain exemption from the landing 604 
obligation under two specific circumstances, namely, proven difficulties in improving 605 
selectivity; and disproportionate costs of handling the otherwise discarded material. This 606 
provision allows up to 5% (7% and 6% in the first two years respectively) of the total annual 607 
catch to be exempted from the LO (Art 15 (5)). Finally, quota management will account for 608 
the changes to the way catches are monitored under the landing obligation. A system of 609 
‘quota uplift’ has been agreed whereby previously discarded catches, which were accounted 610 
for in estimates of fishing mortality, will become part of the allocated quotas rather than be 611 
treated as a separate component of mortality. Therefore, the same quantity of fish can be 612 
caught, but there is an increase allocated quota. Because all catches need to be deducted from 613 
quota, not just landings, overall this should be a zero-sum game, assuming estimates of 614 
discards are accurate. However, owing to Member States having different quota share and 615 
fleets having different discard rates, some will effectively gain quota, while others will have 616 
to avoid catching fish to avoid a premature end to the fishing season.   617 
There is a risk that the inter-species and inter-year flexibility concessions and 618 
exemptions on the basis of high survival or de minimis will reduce the motivation of fishers 619 
to alter their catch compositions and avoid unwanted catches. However, because of the 620 
limitations and restrictions on the levels of banking and borrowing, interspecies flexibility, de 621 
minimis and survival exemptions, there is still anticipated to be substantial advantage for 622 
fishing businesses to change the selectivity of their fishing operations to avoid catching 623 
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previously discarded catches. Mangi and Catchpole [6] conclude that the relatively low value 624 
of fish for non-human consumption markets is unlikely to create an incentive for fishers to 625 
target more of the fish currently discarded with the implementation of the LO. 626 
 627 
5. Conclusion and recommendations 628 
The LO is one of the most significant changes there has been in the history of the CFP, 629 
calling for a fundamental review of how to manage and control fishing activities in the EU. 630 
The expectation is that the landing requirement combined with the restriction to non-human 631 
consumption purposes will encourage fishers to internalise the costs of catching unwanted 632 
fish and motivate them to avoid unwanted catch, for example by altering their fishing 633 
practices. However, in order to realise this, sufficient flexibility must be exercised to allow 634 
fishers to find their own solutions to reducing unwanted catches.  635 
Close cooperation between industry and the public sector is needed to minimise 636 
uncertainties that act as a constraint on investment in utilisation schemes. Governments and 637 
sector leaders need to encourage the relevant parties to initiate collaborative pilot projects on 638 
the logistics and marketing opportunities of utilising otherwise unwanted catches, including 639 
supporting feasibility studies where possible. Financial support, including through the EMFF, 640 
should be provided for such schemes. Also, the efficacy of the marketing rules for using these 641 
catches needs to be kept under close scrutiny. The possibility should exist for incentive-based 642 
systems to be developed at the regional level and for different schemes to be developed in 643 
different regions, or even within the same region for different fisheries/products, to enable 644 
successful markets to emerge.  645 
Measures should be taken by the EU to allow more flexibility in the application of the 646 
LO regulations in mixed fisheries where the inadvertent capture of choke species would 647 
prevent fishers from catching their legitimate quota of other species. In addition to the 648 
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exemptions permitting quota and discarding flexibilities in Article 15 of the CFP basic 649 
Regulation, which should be used whenever appropriate, such measures could include more 650 
relaxed rules on gear selectivity, a culture shift based on a flexible framework designed to 651 
ensure better management, reward good practice, and rely less on detailed and prescriptive 652 
technical rules. Attention should also be given to developing proposals for establishing a 653 
system of rewards for vessels that are successful in increasing selectivity (for example, based 654 
on models such as the Scottish Conservation Credit Scheme 655 
[http://www.seafoodscotland.org/ja/news-publications/publications/262-scottish-656 
conservation-credits-scheme-info-leaflet.html]. Fishing gear adaptations should be fostered 657 
within the regional framework, in close cooperation with industry, since industry is best 658 
placed to know what works and what does not, and can exchange experience. Thus, while 659 
basic or default requirements can be set at European level, there should be the option to 660 
override these at regional and specific fishery level. Even at the level of the vessel, different 661 
technical adaptations may be permissible provided that the result is increased selectivity. All 662 
this should support an efficient quota market whereby international swaps can be agreed 663 
between Member States to prevent fishers from stopping fishing when all other measures 664 
have been taken. Together this would enable implementation of the landing obligation to 665 
respond directly and flexibly to the particular realities of a fishery and to reduce the pressures 666 
on the fishing sector in meeting the LO, thereby reinforcing compliance. 667 
Remote electronic monitoring should be introduced for all vessels, or a representative 668 
number, as soon as possible, because it is demonstrating sufficient potential to be pursued 669 
more extensively. In the short-term, further trials should be developed and implemented and 670 
analysis made of any technical and governance issues. These trials should continue to be 671 
industry-led and reward-based, and funding in support of these initiatives should be made 672 
available through the EMFF. Moreover, in the long-term, the European Commission should 673 
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develop a proposal for a Regulation on a governance and legal framework for REM, to clarify 674 
the distribution of responsibilities between the scientific and regulatory institutions in order to 675 
ensure adequate quality-proofing and proper use of the data (including storage and access to 676 
data, legal obligation to delete videos, choice of hauls to be monitored, estimation methods) 677 
and the proper role and use of REM data in enforcement processes. 678 
Lastly, more use of spatio-temporal closures is needed to help fishers avoid areas with 679 
large numbers of undersized fish. There is scope to develop regional schemes which 680 
determine the practical modalities of the pattern that sets out when areas should be avoided 681 
and create information-sharing platforms that would enable move-on decisions to be made 682 
and communicated quickly. Along with the increased regionalization, already occurring in 683 
EU fisheries management as part of the reformed CFP, there should be greater consultation 684 
with stakeholders in the implementation of the LO. The consultation process needs to be 685 
more effectively executed, and all relevant stakeholders need to be given a realistic 686 
opportunity to input their views. In the longer-term, more extensive regional co-management 687 
needs to be developed. Any new controls must balance the need for effective control with the 688 
need to avoid making the industry less efficient. 689 
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Table 1: Landings (t), discards (t) and proportion of discards under minimum conservation 870 
reference size (uMCRS) by country and gear. Table sorted in descending order on the 871 
average catch 2010-2012 within each country. 872 
 873 
 874 
 875 
 876 
 877 
oMCRS uMCRS
BEAM_TRAWLS 10,138      5,663          15,801       36% 2,315    3,344    59% 21%
OTTER_TRAWLS 1,131         1,598          2,730          59% 1,147    451       28% 17%
NETTERS 100            2                  102             2% 1            1            30% 1%
OTTER_TRAWLS 19,594      7,578          27,172       28% 5,466    2,111    28% 8%
BEAM_TRAWLS 1,794         1,484          3,278          45% 996       487       33% 15%
NETTERS 1,656         57                1,713          3% 35          22          39% 1%
LONGLINES 25               0                  25                1% 0            0            47% 0%
POTS&TRAPS 7                 0                  7                  1% 0            0            62% 0%
OTTER_TRAWLS 46,009      7,628          53,636       14% 4,585    3,043    40% 6%
NETTERS 8,843         846             9,689          9% 661       183       22% 2%
BEAM_TRAWLS 1,323         115             1,438          8% 12          103       89% 7%
SEINES 569            76                646             12% 44          32          42% 5%
LONGLINES 441            11                452             2% 6            4            41% 1%
DREDGE 7                 1                  7                  8% -        1            100% 8%
POTS&TRAPS 62               1                  63                1% 0            0            60% 1%
OTTER_TRAWLS 1,543         10,929       12,472       88% 8,403    2,526    23% 20%
NETTERS 2                 0                  2                  3% 0            0            2% 0%
Estonia OTTER_TRAWLS 519            89                607             15% 60          29          33% 5%
OTTER_TRAWLS 22,141      13,006       35,147       37% 8,494    4,512    35% 13%
NETTERS 2,351         248             2,599          10% 201       47          19% 2%
BEAM_TRAWLS 558            108             666             16% 75          34          31% 5%
OTTER_TRAWLS 12,547      6,495          19,042       34% 3,503    2,991    46% 16%
NETTERS 1,371         19                1,390          1% 17          2            10% 0%
BEAM_TRAWLS 1,254         825             2,079          40% 607       218       26% 10%
OTTER_TRAWLS 2,487         153             2,640          6% 99          54          35% 2%
NETTERS 326            50                376             13% 32          18          37% 5%
OTTER_TRAWLS 2,690         408             3,098          13% 275       133       33% 4%
NETTERS 1,796         147             1,943          8% 100       47          32% 2%
BEAM_TRAWLS 35,401      26,273       61,674       43% 17,637 8,637    33% 14%
OTTER_TRAWLS 5,913         9,256          15,169       61% 6,866    2,389    26% 16%
NETTERS 253            2                  255             1% 1            0            23% 0%
OTTER_TRAWLS 7,714         1,114          8,827          13% 832       282       25% 3%
NETTERS 3,533         254             3,787          7% 170       84          33% 2%
LONGLINES 1,082         82                1,164          7% 48          34          41% 3%
POTS&TRAPS 2                 0                  3                  7% 0            0            66% 5%
OTTER_TRAWLS 11,955      3,012          14,967       20% 1,956    1,057    35% 7%
NETTERS 1,956         70                2,026          3% 43          27          39% 1%
LONGLINES 667            35                702             5% 21          14          41% 2%
POTS&TRAPS 8                 0                  8                  1% 0            0            54% 0%
OTTER_TRAWLS 71,734      25,316       97,050       26% 15,150 10,068 40% 10%
BEAM_TRAWLS 3,183         1,474          4,657          32% 939       535       36% 11%
NETTERS 660            67                726             9% 60          7            10% 1%
285,347    124,488     409,835     30% 80,858 43,527 35% 11%
Poland
Sweden
United Kingdom
Total
Spain
France
Ireland
Lithuania
Latvia
Netherlands
Discards (t) Proportion 
discards uMCRS
Proportion of 
catch uMCRS
Belgium
Germany
Catch (t)
Proportion 
Discards (%)
Denmark
Country Gear
Landings 
(t)
Discards (t)
37 
 
Table 2: Landings (t), discards (t) and proportion of discards under minimum landing size 878 
(uMCRS), by country and species; table sorted in descending order on the average catch 879 
2010-2012 within each country. 880 
 881 
 882 
oMCRS uMCRS
Plaice 5,970           5,443          11,413       48% 2,429    3,015    55% 26%
Sole 3,428           302              3,730          8% 100       199       67% 5%
Cod 960               180              1,139          16% 83          97          54% 9%
Haddock 278               844              1,123          75% 534       310       37% 28%
Megrim 575               160              735             22% 155       5            3% 1%
Whiting 158               333              491             68% 163       171       51% 35%
Saithe 2                    0                   2                  4% 0            0            6% 0%
Cod 9,523           994              10,517       9% 609       385       39% 4%
Saithe 9,882           249              10,131       2% 231       18          7% 0%
Plaice 3,843           7,858          11,701       67% 5,678    2,181    28% 19%
Haddock 692               88                779             11% 39          48          55% 6%
Sole 445               28                473             6% 12          16          57% 3%
Whiting 90                 51                141             36% 12          39          77% 28%
Cod 27,138         3,795          30,933       12% 2,686    1,109    29% 4%
Plaice 19,754         3,761          23,516       16% 2,186    1,576    42% 7%
Saithe 7,219           195              7,414          3% 176       19          10% 0%
Haddock 2,461           888              3,349          27% 244       643       72% 19%
Sole 673               26                699             4% 18          6            25% 1%
Whiting 94                 23                117             20% 7            16          69% 14%
Haddock 38                 10,015        10,052       100% 7,579    2,435    24% 24%
Megrim 1,504           912              2,416          38% 823       90          10% 4%
Whiting 4                    2                   5                  31% 1            0            24% 7%
Estonia Cod 885               143              1,028          14% 91          52          36% 5%
Haddock 8,030           9,500          17,530       54% 6,464    3,036    32% 17%
Cod 3,699           1,750          5,449          32% 751       1,000    57% 18%
Saithe 4,439           3                   4,442          0% 3            0            3% 0%
Whiting 2,927           1,042          3,969          26% 705       337       32% 8%
Megrim 1,976           418              2,395          17% 379       39          9% 2%
Plaice 1,755           607              2,361          26% 442       164       27% 7%
Sole 2,228           42                2,270          2% 26          17          40% 1%
Haddock 4,241           3,652          7,893          46% 1,870    1,782    49% 23%
Whiting 5,100           2,077          7,177          29% 1,271    806       39% 11%
Megrim 2,956           589              3,545          17% 553       37          6% 1%
Cod 1,304           611              1,915          32% 203       408       67% 21%
Saithe 1,128           5                   1,134          0% 5            1            15% 0%
Plaice 267               431              698             62% 242       189       44% 27%
Sole 177               11                189             6% 10          2            13% 1%
Lithuania Cod 2,889           221              3,110          7% 144       77          35% 2%
Latvia Cod 4,675           609              5,284          12% 409       200       33% 4%
Plaice 30,217         32,090        62,307       52% 23,274 8,816    27% 14%
Sole 8,644           1,461          10,104       14% 707       754       52% 7%
Cod 2,152           251              2,403          10% 145       106       42% 4%
Whiting 424               1,582          2,007          79% 277       1,306    83% 65%
Haddock 145               146              291             50% 101       45          31% 15%
Saithe 17                 0                   17                1% 0            0            11% 0%
Cod 12,414         1,369          13,783       10% 1,033    336       25% 2%
Plaice 45                 117              162             72% 43          74          63% 46%
Cod 12,946         2,526          15,472       16% 1,683    843       33% 5%
Saithe 1,361           184              1,545          12% 167       17          9% 1%
Plaice 233               350              582             60% 181       168       48% 29%
Haddock 277               134              411             33% 31          103       77% 25%
Whiting 43                 4                   47                9% 1            4            86% 8%
Sole 23                 0                   23                1% 0            0            24% 0%
Haddock 29,688         9,748          39,436       25% 3,902    5,845    60% 15%
Saithe 13,991         4,776          18,767       25% 4,396    380       8% 2%
Cod 12,908         4,903          17,811       28% 3,486    1,416    29% 8%
Whiting 9,235           5,032          14,267       35% 2,731    2,301    46% 16%
Plaice 4,476           1,795          6,271          29% 1,081    617       36% 10%
Megrim 4,563           585              5,148          11% 542       43          7% 1%
Sole 787               22                809             3% 14          8            35% 1%
287,993       124,936      412,929     30% 81,127 43,707 35% 11%
United Kingdom
Total
Spain
France
Ireland
Netherlands
Poland
Sweden
Discards (t) Proportion 
discards uMCRS
Proportion of 
catch uMCRS
Belgium
Germany
Catch (t)
Proportion 
Discards (%)
Denmark
Country Gear Landings (t) Discards (t)
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Table 3: Proportion of the total landings at each port in 2003 (source: EAFPA, 2005) and 883 
estimates on proportion of undersize discards per port. *The landings from UK are from 884 
2013. 885 
 886 
Country
Number 
of ports
Port name
Proportion of 
total landings
Indicative 
uMCRS per 
port (t)
Country
Number 
of ports
Port name
Proportion 
landings
Indicative 
uMCRS per 
port (t)
Zeebrugge 68% Peterhead 28%
Oostende 31% Others 13%
Nieuwpoort 1% 50 - 100 Lerwick 12%
Skagen 24% Fraserburgh 6%
Esbjerg 22% Brixham
Thyboron 17% Scrabster
Elvrige Eavne 14% Plymouth
Hanstholm 9% Newlyn
Hirtshals 7% Ardglass
Bornholm Kinlochbervie
Greni Douglas
Hvide Sande Kirkcudbright
Boulogne/Mer 16% >1000 Kilkeel
Le Guilvinec 8% Ullapool
Lorient 7% Mallaig
Granville 6% Holyhead
Concarneau 5% Leigh-on-Sea
Saint Guenole 5% Scalloway and Isles
Erouy Portavogie
Saint Quay Portrieux Milford Haven
La Turballe Shoreham
Cherbourg Bridlington
Port En Bessin North Shields
Saint Jean De Luz Newhaven
Loctudy Kings Lynn
Sete Ilfracombe
Saint Gilles Saundersfoot
Les Sables D'Olonne Boston
Fecamp Lochinver
Roscoff Whitstable
Ole Ron Campbeltown
Dieppe Troon
Douarnenez Teignmouth
Le Croisic Cullivoe
Port La Nouvelle Whitehaven
Copemart Grimsby
Grau Du Roi Oban
La Rochelle Eastbourne
Arcachon Stromness
Noirmoutier Portsmouth
Grandcamp Weymouth
Ile D Yeu Scarborough
Proguaport Port St Mary
Loguivy Salcombe
Brest Fishguard
Port De Bouc Blyth
Saint Malo Peel
Ouiberon Whitby
Dunkerque Stornoway
Agde Wells
Audierne Warrenpoint
Port Vendres
Royan
Cancale
Lesconil
Grand-Fort-Philippe
United 
Kingdom*
51
>1000
1- 3% 100 - 500
1% 50 -100
<1% <50
2%
1%
1% 50 -100
Belgium 3
>1000
Denmark 9
500 - 1000
100 - 500
2% 50 -100
<1% <50
France 44
500 - 1000
100 - 500
4%
3%
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Table 3 Continued 887 
 888 
Country
Number 
of ports
Port name
Proportion 
landings
Indicative 
uMCRS per 
port (t)
Killybegs 46% >1000
Rossavea I 7%
Other Ports 6%
Cobh 5%
Dunmore East 4%
Wicklow 4%
Rathmullan
Dingle
Castletownbere
Howth
Pena
Greendastle 2%
Union Hall
Downings
Kilmore Quay
Kinsale
Battimore
Schull
Malin Head
Clogherhead
Moviller
Crosshaveri
Durmnnori/St. Helens
Burtonport
Valehtia
Pailycotion
Skerries
Helvick
Arklow
Parma Gee
Gast Egregory
Dunlaogha Ire.
Courtown
Garrigaholt
Werford
Athills
Carna
Aran Islands
Bantry
Yerseke 34%
Urk 19%
Harlingen
Ijrnuiden
Lauwersoog 7%
Den Helder
Goedereede
Vlissingen
Den Oever 3%
Scheveningen 3%
Breskens 2%
Colijnsplaat 1%
Zoutkamp 0% <50
Ireland 39
500 - 1000
100 - 500
3%
1%
1% 50 -100
<1% <50
Netherlands 13
>1000
9%
500-1000
5%
100 - 500
